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I hough there is much to commend the decision, a word of 
com ment is in order. The judicial process has resolved the problem 
of whether there should he liab ilih  for trespass in the absence of 
intent or negligence bv leaving the innocent partv, who has suffered 
a loss due to a lawful act on the part of another innocent party, 
entirely w ithout redress. Is there a more acceptable solution?
It is not w ithin the scope of this note to discuss the incidence and 
apportionm ent of losses. There is, however, a trend towards com­
pensation for all losses suffered in the course of peaceful pursuits. 
The common law rule regarding contributory negligence left the 
p laintiff with no right of recovery; this problem was solved by legis­
lation which enabled the Courts to apportion the loss and award 
damages accordingly. T he positions of negligent and innocent parties 
arc not alike, but perhaps it would not oc unprofitable to consider 
the possibility of some legislative approach to the problem of losses 
suffered bv innocent parties and occasioned bv innocent parties.
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C rim inal Law — Insanity — Lack of knowledge that act causing death 
was “wrong” — Belief that act, while legally wrong, was morally right.
T he defense of insanity in a murder trial, for about the last one 
hundred years, has been guided by the rule laid down in M cN aughten ’s 
case. (1) T he rule is, “Every man is presumed to be sane, and to 
possess a sufficient degree of reason, to he responsible for his crimes, 
until the contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the jurv; to establish 
a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clcarlv proved that at 
the tim e of the com m itting of the act, the partv was labouring under 
such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act lie  was doing, or, if lie did know it, 
that he did not know lie was doing what was wrong.”
In the present case, the accused relied solclv upon the defense of 
insanitv. He was convicted before Devlin J. of murdering his wife bv 
adm inistering to her one hundred aspirin tablets. Devlin J. held that 
there was no ease of insanitv to be put to the jurv, and the accused was 
found guilty. T he case was appealed. T he accused was a man of 
weak character who was involved in an unhappy marriage w ith a woman 
eighteen years his senior. She always talked of suicide as an escape 
from her sickness. T he accused became obsessed with this idea and 
discussed it w ith his fellow workers. Just before the crime was com­
m itted, one of the workmen, in a jocular vein, suggested that the 
accused “give her a dozen aspirin” . l i e  then gave her the fatal dose. 
Subsequently he told the police that lie supposed that he would be 
hanged for it.
1 1843, <10 Cl. and Fin. 200).
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Goddard C . J. delivered the House of Lords judgment. The appeal 
was based solelv on the meaning of the word “wrong’’ as set out in the 
M cN aughten rule (supra). Doctors produced both Dy the Crown and 
the accused agreed that the accused knew that he was doing an illegal 
act. At this point, Devlin J. had refused to allow the jurv to decide 
upon the accused’s insanity, since knowledge of his act, as being an 
illegal act. was sufficient to overthrow the defense of insanity. The 
accused .probably believed that he was doing an act morally right in 
relieving his wife from her earthly suffering. The evidence of comm­
unicated insanity, known as “folie a deux” which arises from constant 
attendance 011 a person of unsound m ind was vague. The defense 
stated that the M cN aughten rule included “morally wrong” to be 
sufficient to exonerate the accused.
A court of law can only distinguish between that which is in ac- 
cordancc with law and that which is contrarv to law. M any acts are 
contrary to both God and man; e.g. “Thou shalt not k ill”, and “Thou 
shalt not steal” . But, “Thou shalt not commit adultery.” so far as 
crim inal law is concerned, is not contrary to law of man, though con­
trary to the law  of God. (Perhaps Lord Justicc Goddard’s example is 
not too appropriate here in New Brunswick.)
Rex v R ivett (2) supports the finding in this case by saying the 
test of insanity included, “ . . . trial of such person for that offence 
that he was insane, so as not to be responsible according to law for his 
actions at the time when the act or ommission was done . . . "  T he 
m eaning implies that the wrong must be a legal wrong.
Rex v Kierstead (3) is one of the few appeal eases in the province 
of New Brunswick dealing with the defense of insanity. Barrv J. 
found the accuscd guilty of murdering his wife. W h ite  J. affirmed 
this judgment holding that the accused merely suffered from insane 
delusions, and that the heavy duty of establishing the defense 
of insanitv bcvond a reasonable doubt was not discharged. The accuscd 
obviously knew that what he did was wrong. “W rong” is not employed 
in the strict sense of the present case. Although arriving at the same 
conclusion, this case would have been simplified, if it had the present 
case as a precedent. M cN aughten’s rule has been universallv applied 
to insanity eases, whether it b e  conccrncd with delusions, disease of 
the m ind, or insanity itself.
T he accused realized that his act was illegal, and the rule was 
therefore satisfied. Devlin J. was correct in withdrawing the question 
of insanity from the jury. From the evidence, it could not be left to 
the jurv to give a verdict of insanity instead of guiltv.
Devlin J. in the first instance and Goddard C. J. in the House of 
Lords, by their respective judgments in this case, have reduced the 
generality of the M cN aughten case to a more specific rule.
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